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Assessing Prevention Measures and Sin Nombre
Hantavirus Seroprevalence Among Workers at
Yosemite National Park
Jason A. Wilken, PhD,1,2 Rebecca Jackson, MPH,1,3 Barbara L. Materna, PhD, CIH,1
Gayle C. Windham, PhD,1 Barryett Enge, MS,1 Sharon Messenger, PhD,1 Dongxiang Xia, MD, PhD,1
Barbara Knust, DVM, MPH,4 Danielle Buttke, DVM, PhD, MPH,5 Rachel Roisman, MD, MPH,1
for the Yosemite Hantavirus Outbreak Investigation Team
Background During 2012, a total of 10 overnight visitors to Yosemite National Park
(Yosemite) became infected with a hantavirus (Sin Nombre virus [SNV]); three died. SNV
infections have been identified among persons with occupational exposure to deer mice
(Peromyscus maniculatus).
Methods We assessed SNV infection prevalence, work and living environments, mice
exposures, and SNV prevention training, knowledge, and practices among workers of two
major employers at Yosemite during September–October, 2012 by voluntary blood testing
and a questionnaire.
Results One of 526 participants had evidence of previous SNV infection. Participants
reported frequently observing rodent infestations at work and home and not always
following prescribed safety practices for tasks, including infestation cleanup.
Conclusion Although participants had multiple exposures to deer mice, we did not find
evidence of widespread SNV infections. Nevertheless, employees working around deer
mice should receive appropriate training and consistently follow prevention policies for
high-risk activities. Am. J. Ind. Med. 58:658–667, 2015.  2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
KEY WORDS: hantavirus; Sin Nombre virus; disease transmission; infectious;
occupational health
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the most common hantavirus
infection resulting in hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS)
is attributable to Sin Nombre virus (SNV). HPS is
characterized by a nonspecific febrile illness, followed by
severe, rapid onset of pulmonary edema, and collapse. HPS is
rare in the United States, with 585 confirmed cases during
1993–2012; approximately 36% of reported HPS cases in the
United States are fatal [MacNeil et al., 2011; Centers for
Disease and Prevention, 2012a]. The majority of HPS cases
occur in the western United States [Knust and Rollin, 2013].
Deermice (Peromyscus maniculatus) are a reservoir for SNV
[Childs et al., 1994], and shed virus in their saliva, feces, and
urine. Hantavirus infections result from inhalation of
aerosolized excreta associated with sweeping, handling, or
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otherwise disturbing rodent excreta or nests in buildings,
handling mice or excreta without gloves, and sleeping on the
ground or floor [Armstrong et al., 1995; Zeitz et al., 1995;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2002].
Hantavirus infections have been rarely documented among
employees who handle or are exposed to mice [Jay et al.,
1996; Fulhorst et al., 2007; Kelt et al., 2007; Torres-Perez
et al., 2010].
During the summer of 2012, an outbreak of hantavirus
infections occurred among overnight visitors to Yosemite
National Park (Yosemite) in California [Nunez et al., 2014].
Ten patients were identified, 9 of whom had stayed in
signature tent cabins, a type of guest lodging unique to
Yosemite. Eight patients experienced HPS, and 3 died.
Antibodies reactive to SNV were detected in 10 of 74 (14%)
deer mice trapped near Yosemite signature tent cabins during
2012 [Nunez et al., 2014], and in 50 of 255 (20%) trapped at
15 U.S. Forest Service facilities in California during 2004–
2005 [Levine et al., 2008].
Yosemite employees might be exposed to mice at work,
and a substantial number of Yosemite employees who reside
within Yosemite might also be exposed to mice at home.
Concurrent with the investigation of hantavirus infections
among Yosemite overnight visitors, the National Park
Service (NPS) requested assistance from the Occupational
Health Branch of the California Department of Public Health
(CDPH) in evaluating hantavirus safety practices and the
potential for hantavirus exposures among Yosemite workers.
The 2 largest employers at Yosemite are a government
agency and private-sector employer, hereafter, referred to as
Employers A and B.
The Yosemite hantavirus risk reduction program (dated
April 25, 2012, herein referred to as the Directive) is a park
policy that contains definitions, responsibilities, and proce-
dures for protecting employees from hantavirus exposure,
and covers all Yosemite employees, volunteers, and
contractors. Thus, it could serve as the standard by which
to evaluate employee knowledge and practices. Consistent
with recommendations from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention [Centers for Disease and Prevention, 2012b],
the Directive identifies preventing rodent infestations as the
most effective method to prevent employee exposure to
hantavirus, and specifies practices for rodent exclusion and
reduction of rodent shelter and food sources. The Directive
defines cleaning a heavy rodent infestation (“piles of feces or
numerous nests or dead rodents”) and opening seasonally-
closed buildings, which can harbor infestations, as high-risk
activities that can aerosolize hantavirus-containing particles.
Cleaning a light infestation (“few droppings in one area, a
few nests, and one or two dead rodents”) is considered lower
risk. All employees are required to be able to assess whether
an infestation is light or heavy and to be able to clean up a
light infestation safely. Employees whose duties include
performing high-risk activities are to be provided with
in-depth training and additional protections (e.g., inclusion in
a comprehensive respiratory protection program).
The Directive assigns responsibility for ensuring
implementation of safe cleanup procedures to specified
health and safety personnel, as well as managers, super-
visors, and work leaders. Building and grounds supervisors
are responsible for identifying and assigning employees who
will perform heavy rodent infestation cleanup. The Directive
requires cleaning of light and heavy infestations by
saturating dead mice, nests, droppings, and contaminated
surfaces with a bleach solution or chemical disinfectant,
waiting 10min to allow for deactivation of any hantavirus,
picking up infestations with paper towels, and bagging all
waste.
The Directive also identifies required personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE) for cleaning a light or heavy infestation
and for opening a seasonally-closed building. Employees
cleaning a heavy infestation or opening a seasonally-closed
building must use respiratory protection (a half-mask
negative-pressure air purifying respirator with P-100 filters,
or a powered air purifying respirator [PAPR] with equivalent
filters). The Directive requires employees cleaning a heavy
infestation to wear rubber, latex, or nitrile gloves, protective
coveralls, goggles, and shoe covers. Employees cleaning a
light infestation are required to wear gloves; use of goggles
or respiratory protection is voluntary.
The purpose of this investigation was to (i) detect
previous hantavirus infections among employees, (ii) assess
exposure risk factors and mitigation measures, and (iii)
recommend additional measures to prevent hantavirus
exposures among employees if appropriate.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Survey Design, Setting, and Participants
The cross-sectional survey consisted of a blood test and
a self-administered questionnaire. The questionnaire includ-
ed questions on work activities, living environment, past
exposures tomice, training and knowledge aboutmeasures to
prevent hantavirus infection, and use of exposure prevention
measures. The questionnaire development was guided by a
review of the Directive and an onsite investigation that
included observations of work locations, conditions, and
practices related to rodent control measures and disinfection/
cleanup procedures; interviews with employees and man-
agers identified as having employee health and safety
responsibilities; and review of written materials related to
hantavirus prevention and respiratory protection among
employees. We designed questions to compare employee
knowledge or use of hantavirus safety practices with the
policies outlined in the Directive. Employees were
recruited through an e-mail from employers, posted flyers,
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supervisors, and word-of-mouth. Participation in the survey
was completely voluntary, all participants read and signed a
written informed consent form before survey administration,
and employees had the option of completing the question-
naire, the blood test, or both. At the time of survey
administration, workers were screened for acute disease, and
any persons who had influenza-like symptoms were
excluded and referred to their primary care providers. HPS
initially manifests as a nonspecific febrile illness, and the
purpose of our screening was to encourage employees who
had influenza-like symptoms to seek medical care. We did
not follow up with screened individuals.
Employer A invited 100 employees to participate in a
pilot survey, which CDPH administered on September 26,
2012. Pilot survey participants completed the survey and
then participated in a semi-structured interviewwith a CDPH
investigator to assess questionnaire comprehension, deter-
mine how employees received information about hantavirus,
and allow participants to discuss hantavirus safety concerns.
Information from the semi-structured interviews was used to
add three additional questions and to clarify the response
choices for employees cleaning heavy and light infestations.
Our experience with the pilot survey allowed for planning the
logistics of a larger survey, made available to all remaining
employees of Employers A and B; our methods did not
significantly differ between the pilot and final survey
administration, other than logistical considerations. The
final survey was administered on October 16–17, 2012.
Blood Specimen Collection and Analysis
Consistent with other published investigations [Fritz
et al., 2002; Gardner et al., 2005; Fulhorst et al., 2007], blood
samples were analyzed for evidence of previous infection by
testing for SNV IgG antibodies. Blood collections were
performed at Yosemite by licensed phlebotomists, public
health nurses, or volunteer registered nurses. Approximately
8ml of whole blood was collected in a serum-separator tube
from each participant. Blood samples were allowed to clot at
room temperature for 2 hr, chilled at 4°C overnight, delivered
to the CDPH Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory, and
tested for SNV IgG antibodies by enzyme-linked immuno-
sorbent assay [Ksiazek et al., 1999; Bostik et al., 2000]. For
any blood sample positive for SNV IgG, SNV IgM was also
tested. Fourfold dilutions were performed, 1:100–1:6,400,
and titers 1:400 were considered positive.
Data Analysis
Survey participation rates were estimated on the basis of
employee information provided by Employers A and B.
Questionnaire responses from the pilot survey and final
survey were combined, with the exception of questions that
were added after the pilot survey was conducted. All study
results, other than participation rates, represent aggregates for
Employers A and B. Employees were categorized into
mutually exclusive job categories on the basis of self-
reported job title and job description information provided by
the employers. Employees were classified as residing in the
park if they responded that they resided in Yosemite during
the previous 12 months. The Yosemite boundary town of El
Portal has certain park-owned housing, but the majority of
housing in El Portal is privately owned; for this analysis,
residing in El Portal was not considered residing in Yosemite.
Only employees who opened seasonally-closed buildings,
cleaned heavy infestations, or cleaned light infestations were
asked about their access to and use of PPE. Analysis of
respirator fit testing excluded employees who reported using
PAPRs, as use of a loose-fitting PAPR does not require fit
testing. Statistical analyses were performed by using SAS
1
9.3 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC).
Human Subjects Review and Participant
Notifications
The California Health and Human Services Agency’s
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects determined
that this investigation was public health practice (i.e.,
nonresearch). All participants were informed of their
individual serologic test results and aggregate employee
serologic test results bymail. Aggregate serologic test results
were also provided to the 2 employers. CDPH provided
aggregate questionnaire results and recommendations (simi-
lar to those under Conclusions) to the employers and worked
with the employers to make a summary of key findings
available to employees.
RESULTS
Survey Participants
Ninety-five employees participated in the pilot survey;
433 employees participated in the final survey (Fig. 1). Two
employees reported influenza-like symptoms during the
screening process, and were referred to their medical provider;
CDPH,CDC,andNPShave received no reports ofHPSamong
these workers. A total of 319/1,008 (32%) of Employer A
employees and 209/1,667 (13%) of Employer B employees
participated in either the pilot or final survey. Six declined to
complete the questionnaire, and 2 declined to provide a blood
sample. The majority of participants were men and white;
median age was 43 years (Table I). Employees representing a
range of occupations and job tenure participated. The majority
were year-round employees, college-educated, and resided in
Yosemite during at least part of the year.
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Blood Testing Results
Of the 526 participants whose blood samples were
tested, one had detectable SNV IgG but had no detectable
SNV IgM, which indicates a previous infection with SNV.
The employee was interviewed by CDPH staff and did not
have an illness compatible with HPS during 2012. This
employee had opened seasonally-closed buildings at
Yosemite previously, but not in the past 12 months. This
employee also had cleaned a light infestation at their work
and at home in the past 12 months, but had not cleaned a
heavy infestation at their work or at home in the past
12 months, and had not worked in the signature tent cabins.
Exposure to Mice
Twenty-five percent of participants reported having
cleaned a heavy infestation at work during the previous
12 months (Table II), and 79 of the 351 (23%) participants
who resided in Yosemite during the previous 12 months
reported having cleaned a heavy infestation at home. In total,
31% of participants reported having cleaned a heavy
infestation in Yosemite during the previous 12 months at
either work or home. Having cleaned a heavy infestation at
work was most commonly reported by laborers (46%) and
electrician, maintenance, and sanitation workers (43%;
Supplementary Table SI).
FIGURE1. Participation in employee survey. Participation is shown by date. All September participants completed the questionnaire
and provided a blood specimen. Of October participants, two declined to provide a blood specimen, and six declined to complete the
questionnaire.
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Sixty-seven percent of participants reported having
cleaned a light infestation at work during the previous
12 months (Table II), and 215 of the 351 (61%) participants
who resided in Yosemite during the previous 12 months
reported having cleaned a light infestation at home. In total,
the majority of participants (78%) reported having cleaned a
light infestation in Yosemite during the previous 12 months
either at work or home. Having cleaned a light infestation
was most commonly reported by laborers (81%); room
keepers and hospitality workers (79%); electrician, mainte-
nance, and sanitation workers (78%); rangers, trail workers,
and forest management personnel (77%); and management
(75%; Supplementary Table SI).
Forty-two percent of participants reported having opened a
seasonally-closed building during the previous 12 months as
part of theirwork duties (Table II).Having opened a seasonally-
closed building was most commonly reported by electrical,
maintenance, and sanitation workers (70%); rangers and trail
workers (54%); and laborers (46%; Supplementary Table SI).
Sixteen percent of participants reported having worked
in or around signature tent cabins during the previous
12 months (Table II), most commonly room keepers and
hospitality workers (50%); and electrical, maintenance, and
sanitation workers (35%; Supplementary Table SI).
Cleaning Practices
Amongparticipantswho reported having cleaned a heavy
infestation at work, 73% reported always having access to a
chemical disinfectant or bleach (Table III), and of these, 85%
reported always using a disinfectant. Of participants who
reported they always used a disinfectant, 67% reported always
waiting10min after applying a disinfectant before cleaning
the infestation. Taken together, 42% of participants who
reported having cleaned a heavy infestation also reported that
they always followed both of these employer guidelines for
safe disinfection of heavy infestations.
Seventy-seven percent of participants who reported
having cleaned a light infestation at work reported always
having access to a disinfectant, and 69% who reported
cleaning a light infestation at work reported using a
disinfectant when cleaning.
Access to and Use of PPE
Of the 129 participants who reported having cleaned a
heavy infestation at work, 32 (25%) reported being fit-tested
TABLE I. Demographic and Occupational Characteristics of Yosemite
Employee Questionnaire Respondents, September^October, 2012.
N¼ 522*
No. %
Age (yrs)
18^24 22 4
25^34 110 35
35^44 66 21
45^54 54 17
55^64 61 20
65 16 3
Sex
Men 293 56
Women 228 44
Race
White 418 84
Other 50 10
Multiracial 28 6
Hispanic 36 7
Education
High school, GED, or less 56 11
Some college 193 38
Bachelor’s degree or higher 264 51
Occupation
Electrical, maintenance, sanitation, or restoration 97 19
Ranger, trail worker, or forest management 75 14
Food service, customer service, or driver 72 14
Administration, clerical, or office 69 13
Management 67 13
Science 57 11
Medical, search and rescue, security, law, or fire 41 8
Laborer 26 5
Room keepers (housekeeping) or hospitality 18 3
Employment seasonality
Year-round 402 77
Seasonal 117 23
Resided inYosemite during past12 months 351 67
Total time employed at Yosemite
1year 59 11
1^4 years 162 31
5^9 years 104 20
10^19 years 91 17
20^29 years 59 11
30 years 46 9
*Numbers might not always total 522 because not all participants responded
to every question.
TABLE II. Work DutiesAssociatedWithMice Exposure as Reportedby
Yosemite Employee Questionnaire Respondents, September^October,
2012.N¼ 522
Employee activity No. %
Cleaned a heavy infestation at work 129 25
Cleaned a light infestation at work 350 67
Opened a seasonally-closed building 220 42
Worked in or around signature tent cabins 84 16
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for a respirator during the previous 12months or using a loose-
fitting PAPR. Of the 220 who reported having opened a
seasonally-closed building during the previous 12 months, 44
(20%) reported being either being fit-tested for a respirator
during the previous 12 months or using a loose-fitting PAPR.
Among participants who reported having cleaned a
heavy infestation at work, 83% reported always having
access to gloves, and 74% always using gloves (Tables III
and IV). Only 39% reported always having access to goggles,
and 17% reported always using goggles. A limited number of
participants reported wearing coveralls (4%) or shoe covers
(2%). Eleven percent reported having used either a half-mask
negative pressure air purifying respirator with P-100 filters or
a PAPR when cleaning a heavy infestation. Participants’ use
of respiratory protection when opening a seasonally-closed
buildings was not assessed.
Among the 350 participants who reported having
cleaned a light infestation at work, 280 (80%) reported
always having access to gloves, and 224 (64%) reported
always using gloves.
Hantavirus Safety Training and
Knowledge
As displayed in Table V, 42% of participants reported
having received hantavirus training during the previous
12 months with a hands-on component (i.e., performing the
task under supervision and receiving feedback). However,
30% reported that their only training was in the form of a
written brochure or a copy of the Directive. Three percent
reported receiving no training regarding hantavirus safety.
Our survey included multiple choice knowledge ques-
tions based on information contained in the Directive, as
listed in Table VI; detailed responses for each question are
provided in Supplementary Table SII. Questions 3, 4, and 5
were answered correctly by 97%, 89%, and 89% of
participants, respectively, indicating that participants were
substantially aware of how persons are exposed to hantavirus
(inhalation of contaminated particles), whether hantavirus
infection is spread from person to person (has never been
documented), and the period for developing symptoms after
exposure (1–6 weeks). However, only 58% correctly
answered Question 1 (hantavirus can be destroyed by
ordinary chemical disinfectants), and 40% correctly an-
swered Question 2 (all employees are responsible for
determining whether an infestation is light or heavy when
TABLE III. Access to Gloves,Goggles, and Disinfectant, and Use of
Disinfectant for Cleaning Heavy Infestations atWork, as Reportedby
Yosemite Employee Questionnaire Respondents, October, 2012.
N¼108*,Unless Otherwise Noted
No. %
Always had access to bleach or chemical disinfectant 79 73
Always had access to disinfectant
and always used disinfectant (N¼ 79)
67 85
Always had access to disinfectant,
always used disinfectant, and always
waited10 min after applying
disinfectant before cleaning (N¼ 67)
45 67
Always had access to gloves 90 83
Always had access to goggles 42 39
*These questions were not included in the pilot survey ; 108 employees
participating in the final survey reported having cleaned a heavy infestation
at work.
TABLE IV. Use of Personal Protective Equipment for Cleaning Heavy
Infestations at Work as Reported by Yosemite Employee Questionnaire
Respondents, September^October, 2012. N¼129*
No. %
Used rubber, latex, or nitrile gloves 95 74
Used goggles 22 17
Used coveralls 5 4
Used shoe covers 3 2
Used a half-mask negative pressure air
purifying respirator with P-100 filters or PAPR
14 11
Used othera respiratory protection 49 38
Did not use respiratory protection 66 51
*One hundred twenty-nine employees reported having cleaned a heavy
infestation at work.
aIncludes N95 filtering facepiece respirators, respirators of unknown type,
or a mix of specified respiratory protection and other types.
TABLE V. Type of Hantavirus Training Received During the Previous
12 Months, as Reported by Yosemite Employee Questionnaire
Respondents, October, 2012. N¼ 427*,a
No. %
Written brochure or Directiveb only 129 30
Hands-on training 179 42
One-on-one training 29 7
Group training 172 40
Hantavirus discussion
at workmeeting
213 50
Other 32 7
None of the above 14 3
*These questions were not included in the pilot survey.
aMultiple responses were permitted.
bThe Directive is an NPS document detailing hantavirus worker safety policy
and procedures in Yosemite.
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doing a general exposure assessment). We identified no
consistent associations between self-reported type of training
and use of PPEwhen opening a seasonally-closed building or
cleaning a heavy infestation at work, or use of disinfectants
when cleaning a heavy infestation (data not shown).
DISCUSSION
Deer mice are common in Yosemite, and a majority of
employees reported having cleaned a rodent infestation at
work, regardless of their job description or length of time
employed at Yosemite. Only 1 of 526 employees had
evidence of previous hantavirus infection, indicating risk is
low. This employee did not have a history of illness
compatible with HPS during 2012, when certain Yosemite
visitors became ill with HPS. Determining when or how the
employee became infected is not possible from our
investigation. However, the employee’s exposure to mice
did not include work in or around the signature tent cabins,
which were associated with the visitor illnesses, or cleaning a
heavy infestation or opening a seasonally-closed building in
the previous 12 months.
Nine overnight visitors who became infected with SNV
had lodged in signature tent cabins [Nunez et al., 2014], and
because more than 10,000 guests had registered to stay in a
signature tent cabin during June 1, 2012–August 28, 2012,
the risk of infection among overnight guests in signature tent
cabins was <0.1%. Our sample size is too small to compare
the exact risk of infection among employees to that of
overnight guests, and Yosemite employees are not necessar-
ily comparable to visitors in terms of demographics, job
duties, and exposures to mice. Nevertheless, it is notable that
no infections were identified among employees who reported
cleaning a heavy infestation at work, opening a seasonally-
closed building, or working in or around signature tent cabins
in the past 12 months, further highlighting the elevated risk
associated with staying overnight in a signature tent cabin.
The seroprevalence among workers in Yosemite was
consistent with other seroprevalance reports of <1%,
including studies among park workers in the southwestern
United States [Vitek et al., 1996], farmers [Gardner et al.,
2005], workers in multiple industries with frequent mouse
contact (e.g., farming, plumbing or heating, or forestry; Zeitz
et al., 1995), and other occupations (field biologists and
laboratory workers; Fritz et al., 2002; Fulhorst et al., 2007).
The Directive takes a reasonable approach to hantavirus
illness prevention by encouraging the practice of standard
precautions whenever an activity is conducted that might
expose an employee to hantavirus. This method assumes that
all mice are potentially infected and likewise that all contact
with mice infestations poses risk for employee exposure to
infectious rodent excreta through inhalation, breaks in the
skin, or the eyes. The procedures and protective measures
outlined in the Directive for conducting activities that might
expose an employee to hantavirus are consistent with sound
industrial hygiene practice.
Effective implementation of the Directive depends on
a training program that incorporates both basic andin-depth
training; basic training includes training for employees to
correctly identify a heavy rodent infestation, and therefore,
to avoid cleaning if they are not more highly trained and
equipped with required protective gear, andin-depth
training provided for those employees who clean heavy
infestations as part of their duties. Participants were
knowledgeable regarding hantavirus exposure, transmis-
sion, and symptoms, indicating that these aspects of
hantavirus safety had been well communicated. In contrast,
a majority of participants did not know that all employees
are responsible for determining whether an infestation is
light or heavy. However, the 13% of participants who
answered that managers and supervisors are responsible for
determining whether an infestation is light or heavy may
have found the question ambiguous because the Directive
states that supervisors will ensure that employees are
correctly trained to perform rodent activity assessments.
Substantial evidence exists that occupational health and
safety training improves protective behaviors among
workers, including those who might be exposed to
infectious diseases [Robson et al., 2012]. Our results
indicate that participants might have benefitted from
training that effectively addresses the differences between
cleanup of light versus heavy infestations and the
appropriate use of disinfectants during infestation cleanup.
TABLE VI. Hantavirus Knowledge Questions as ReportedbyYosemite Employee Questionnaire Respondents, September^October, 2012.N¼ 522
No. %
Employees correctly answering hantavirus knowledge questions:
Question1: Can ordinary disinfectants (not exclusively for hantavirus) be used to kill the virus in mice droppings? 301 58
Question 2: Who is responsible for assessing whether an infestation is light or heavy? 208 40
Question 3: How are people most likely to be infected with hantavirus? 504 97
Question 4: How frequently is hantavirus transmitted person to person? 462 89
Question 5: When are symptoms of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome most likely to occur after exposure? 462 89
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A substantial number of participants reported not always
having access to disinfectant and gloves when cleaning an
infestation, and most participants who reported cleaning a
heavy infestation or opening a seasonally-closed building
also reported not being fit-tested for a respirator during the
previous 12 months. Difficulties with ensuring employee
access to and use of PPE and disinfectants can be addressed
by additional training for supervisors that emphasizes their
critical role in ensuring that all employees have the necessary
equipment and training to reduce their risk for hantavirus
exposure.
A limited number of investigations have evaluated
employee-reported knowledge of infectious disease hazards
and adherence to employer safety and disease prevention
guidelines. In 2008, employees at U.S. Forest Service sites in
Peromyscus-endemic areas of California reported no exten-
sive training in prevention strategies for rodent-borne
diseases [Levine et al., 2008]. In contrast to our investigation,
employees interviewed by Levine et al. were more
knowledgeable about disinfection techniques than specific
elements of hantavirus biology. In studies of health care
workers, variable (13–88%) knowledge of recommended
PPE was reported among physicians caring for influenza
patients at 4 hospitals during the 2009 influenza H1N1
pandemic; 30% of those not using recommended PPE cited a
lack of PPE availability near patient rooms as their reason for
not using recommended equipment [de Perio et al., 2012].
Associations between training in standard precautions and
PPE compliance, as well as between a perceived safety
climate and PPE compliance, have also been reported among
hospital-based physicians [Michalsen et al., 1997].
Our survey has certain limitations, including that it was
conducted during September and October, 2012, and by that
time, a substantial number of seasonal employees had left for
the year; we were unable to estimate the number of seasonal
employees at Yosemite and therefore are unable to determine
whether participation rates of seasonal and year-round
employees differ. Participation rates were calculated from
employee telephone and payroll lists, which might have been
incomplete. The differential participation rate between
employees of Employer A (32%) and Employer B (13%),
as well as the low overall participation rate, limit the
generalizability of our findings to all Yosemite employees.
Furthermore, bias due to self-selection might have occurred,
either because employees who perceived their work duties as
higher risk volunteered for the survey or because highly
exposed workers were reluctant to participate. Prevalence of
previous hantavirus infection might differ among employees
who participated in the survey compared with those who did
not, and because we screened for evidence of SNV infection
by presence of SNV IgG, it is therefore possible that
employees with recent onset infection were not identified.
However, we are unaware of any reports of HPS among
Yosemite employees, and given the low prevalence of
previous hantavirus infection among outdoor workers [Zeitz
et al., 1995; Vitek et al., 1996; Fritz et al., 2002; Gardner
et al., 2005; Fulhorst et al., 2007], it is unlikely that a
substantial number of Yosemite employees had unidentified
infections. Extensive media coverage of the outbreak might
have influenced employee responses or resulted in reinforce-
ment of safety practices after the outbreak. Self-reporting
through questionnaires introduces the possibility of recall
bias. Finally, although definitions of a heavy and a light
infestation were stated in the questionnaire, employees might
have subjectively perceived a light infestation as a heavy
infestation.
Workers at Yosemite and similar outdoor environments
in the United States are commonly exposed to rodent excreta
and settings that are known risks for HPS. Although we did
not find evidence of occupational illness in this setting, HPS
is a severe illness and prevention efforts are warranted, given
the exposures identified at Yosemite. Hantavirus is not the
only zoonotic risk for employees at Yosemite and in similar
outdoor settings across the United States. Leptospirosis,
plague, rat-bite fever, salmonellosis, tularemia, Rocky
Mountain spotted fever, relapsing fever, and other illnesses
can be transmitted directly or indirectly (e.g., by mosquitos
or ticks) from rodents to humans. Incident infections of
leptospirosis, La Crosse virus, and spotted fever group
rickettsiae have been identified among NPS workers in the
Great Smoky Mountains and Rocky Mountain National
Parks [Adjemian et al., 2012]. Methods for reducing worker
exposure to mice might also reduce worker exposure to other
rodent-borne zoonoses.
The results of this survey identified multiple gaps in
participants’ knowledge and training, and additional oppor-
tunities for exposure, including cleaning an infestation at
home among employees residing in Yosemite, not using or
inappropriately using disinfectants when cleaning up an
infestation, not using PPE when cleaning an infestation, not
using a respirator (or not being fit-tested for the respirator)
when cleaning a heavy infestation or opening a seasonally-
closed building, and not knowing who is responsible for
determining whether an infestation is light or heavy.
Therefore, the authors recommend measures to prevent
exposure to rodent-borne zoonotic diseases, including but
not limited to hantavirus, among workers in outdoor settings
in the United States similar to Yosemite. Our recommenda-
tions include the following specific points.
Implement effective rodent exclusion and control efforts
in employee workspaces. Apply rodent exclusion methods,
following guidance in the NPS Rodent Exclusion Manual
[Hoddenbach et al., 2005].
Implement effective rodent exclusion and control
measures in employee housing. Apply rodent exclusion
efforts to employee housing, and ensure clarity in the process
and responsibility for cleaning heavy mice infestations in
employee housing. Offer opportunities for employee family
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members who reside in employer-provided housing to
receive information or participate in hantavirus awareness
training to learn about symptoms, how to exclude mice, and
how to clean up light infestations among other skills.
Ensure that employees who clean heavy mice infesta-
tions or perform other high-risk tasks have in-depth training
about how to perform this work safely and have necessary
supplies and equipment. Employees whose job includes
cleaning a heavy infestation should be identified in advance,
should be provided in-depth training regarding cleanup
procedures, should receive instruction how to select andwear
PPE, including respiratory protection, and should demon-
strate their ability to safely clean up a heavy infestation.
Employees should always wear a particulate respirator (half-
mask with P-100 filtration or higher level such as powered
air-purifying respirator with equivalent filters) when clean-
ing a heavy infestation. Supervisors or managers should be
responsible for ensuring that PPE and disinfectants are
available to employees cleaning a heavy infestation, and that
safety procedures are consistently followed. If preferred,
face shields can also be used in place of goggles.
Ensure provision of basic hantavirus awareness and
safety training to all employees at least annually. Train all
employees to be able to distinguish between light and heavy
mice infestations, including a hands-on component, with
demonstrations of prescribed light infestation cleaning
practices, and provide periodic reinforcement of training
as needed. Ensure that seasonal employees and contractors
are trained in hantavirus prevention and light infestation
cleaning before they start work for the season.
Ensure implementation of an OSHA-compliant respi-
ratory protection program that includes all employees
who might clean heavy infestations, open seasonally-
closed buildings, or perform any other job duties
considered high-risk for hantavirus exposure. Employer
respiratory protection programs should include written
procedures for all components of a comprehensive respirator
program, including respirator selection, medical clearance,
annual fit testing (for wearers of tight-fitting respirators),
annual training, program evaluation, and recordkeeping that
documents provision of these services for all employees
included in the programs [29 Code of Federal Regulations,
1910.134].
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SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE I. Having Cleaned a Heavy Infestation at Work, Having Cleaned a Light Infestation at Work, Having Opened a 
Seasonally-closed Building, and Having Worked in or Around a Signature Tent Cabin, by Occupation, as Reported by Yosemite Employee 
Questionnaire Respondents, September–October 2012.  N=522. 
 
Job title 
No. 
Cleaned a 
heavy 
infestation, 
No. (%) 
Cleaned a 
light 
infestation, 
No. (%) 
Opened a 
seasonally-
closed 
building, 
No. (%) 
Worked in 
or around a 
signature 
tent cabin, 
No. (%) 
Electrical, maintenance, sanitation, or restoration 97 42 (43) 76 (78) 67 (70) 34 (35) 
Ranger, trail worker, or forest management 75 23 (31) 58 (77) 40 (54) 6 (8) 
Food service, customer service, or driver 72 10 (13) 32 (44) 18 (25) 4 (6) 
Administration, clerical, or office 69 3 (4) 34 (49) 15 (22) 3 (4) 
Management 67 18 (27) 50 (75) 28 (42) 12 (18) 
Science 57 4 (7) 39 (68) 17 (30) 6 (11) 
Medical, search and rescue, security, law, or fire 41 11 (27) 26 (63) 17 (41) 5 (12) 
Laborer 26 12 (46) 21 (81) 12 (46) 5 (19) 
Rooms keeper or hospitality 18 6 (33) 14 (79) 6 (33) 9 (50) 
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SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE II. Answers to Hantavirus Knowledge Questions as Provided by 
Yosemite Employee Questionnaire Respondents, September–October 2012.  N=522. 
Question 1: Can ordinary disinfectants (not exclusively for the hantavirus) be 
used to kill the virus in mice droppings? 
No. % 
Yesa 301 58 
No 127 24 
Do not know or no answer given 94 18 
   
Question 2: Who is responsible for assessing whether an infestation is light or 
heavy?  
 
The person who finds the infestationa 208 40 
Environmental health officer 87 17 
Managers and supervisors 70 13 
Buildings and grounds 18 3 
Do not know or no answer given 139 27 
   
Question 3: How are people most likely to be infected with hantavirus?   
Skin contact with rodents 3 1 
Bites by mosquitos that previously bit an infected rodent 0 0 
Inhalation of airborne particles contaminated with rodent urine,  
saliva, or droppingsa 504 
 
97 
None of the above 0 0 
Other 13 3 
Do not know or no answer given 2 0 
   
Question 4: How frequently is hantavirus transmitted person to person?   
Very frequently 1 0 
Somewhat frequently 3 1 
Not very frequently 19 4 
Person to person transmission of hantavirus has never been documented  
in the United Statesa 463 
 
89 
Do not know or no answer given 36 7 
   
Question 5: When are symptoms of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome  
most likely to occur after exposure?  
 
Within 1 hour after exposure 3 1 
During 2–3 days after exposure 12 2 
More than 4 days, but less than 1 week after exposure 11 2 
From 1 to 6 weeks after exposurea 463 89 
4 
 
Do not know or no answer given 32 6 
 
aCorrect answer. 
